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THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S
PROPOSED REGULATIONS UNDER THE CROWDFUND ACT
STRIKE A NECESSARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE BURDEN
OF DISCLOSURE PLACED ON ISSUERS OF SECURITIES AND
MEANINGFUL PROTECTION FOR UNSOPHISTICATED
INVESTORS
I. INTRODUCTION

On April 5, 2012, Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act (JOBS Act) with the purpose of improving job creation
and economic growth.) A cornerstone provision of the JOBS Act
was Title III, Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and
Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (CROWDFUND Act).2 The
CROWDFUND Act created an exemption to the registration
requirements for issuing equity securities under the Securities Act of
1933 (Securities Act).3 The reasoning behind this exemption was to
relieve small businesses and startup companies from the costly and
burdensome requirements associated with the issuance of security
interests under the existing Securities Act. 4 However, companies
wishing to utilize the exemption to raise capital through the Internet
via the CROWDFUND Act must still comply with the requirements
of the exemption, which includes disclosure of information to
potential investors. 5
This required disclosure provides some
protection to the investor by setting a minimum level of information
relating to the company, its current financial condition, and the
security offering itself. 6
Further protection of potential investors in securities under the
CROWDFUND Act comes from limitations on the amount of

l.

2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The JOBS Act, in part, intended to make
investment capital available to small businesses and start-up companies unable to
obtain financing through existing channels. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
§ 301, 126 Stat. at 315.
Id. § 302, 126 Stat. at 315-16 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012».
See 15 U.S.c. § 77f(describing the registration of securities).
15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b). Section 77d(a)(6)(O) requires companies issuing securities
under the crowdfunding exemption comply with the disclosure requirements
contained in § 77d-I(b). Id. § 77d(a)(6)(O).
See infra Part IV.
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securities an issuer may sell to any particular investor. 7 The issuer is
limited both by the net worth and annual income of the investor and
the amount invested in any issuance by the issuer under the
CROWDFUND Act exemption. 8 This combination of a limitation on
sales to individual investors with required issuer disclosures offers
both a lower cost of disclosure to issuers and protection for the
investor against losses resulting from fraud or misinformation. 9
In addition to the disclosure requirements codified in the
CROWDFUND Act, further action by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is required before the new law can take effect. 10
Specifically, § 77-1(b)(1)(I) left open the option for the SEC to
impose additional requirements, beyond those already contained in
the law, in order to protect investors and the public.ll This particular
provision led to much discussion in the media as to whether the
CROWDFUND Act, along with any additional requirements by the
SEC, would require so much disclosure on the part of small
businesses and startups that it would render the exemption
ineffective. 12

7.
8.
9.

15 u.s.c. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (limiting the total value of securities sold by an issuer to an
individual investor during any 12-month period); see infra Part III.e.
§ 77d(a)(6)(B).
Neither protection of investors from "bad" investments nor assurance of only positive
investment gains has been the goal of securities regulation. Rather, the goal has been
to ensure that potential investors receive all the information needed to make a fair
assessment of the investment opportunity. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or

Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored
Exemption Must be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.e. L. REv. 1735,
10.

11.
12.

1741 (2012).
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 303(b), 126 Stat. 306,
321 (2012). Section 303(b) requires the Commission (SEC) to issue a rulemaking.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(I).
See Andrew A. Schwartz, Roundtable: Keep it Light, Chairman White: SEC
Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 V AND. L. REv. EN BANC 43, 45-46
(2013) [hereinafter Roundtable]; Charles D. Vaughn, Crowdfimding: Is the Hype
Really Justified?, THE DAILY REpORT (Oct. 14, 2013); Carrie Rossenfeld,
Crowdfunding Has Its Pros and Cons, GLOBEST.COM (Sept. 17, 2013, 8:53 AM),
http://www.globest.comlnews/12 _693/10sangeles/finance/Crowdfunding -Has-ItsPros-and-Cons-337672.html; Tammy Whitehouse, JOBS Act Inspires Criticism of
Regulatory and Governance Rollback, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://www.complianceweek.comlnews/news-bulletinljobs-act-inspires-criticism-ofregulatory-and-govemance-rollback#.V APC2_ldWSo; Yin Wilczek, Former SEC
Member Questions Viability of JOBS Act Crowdfunding, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 2,
2013),
http://www.bna.comlformer-sec-member-questions-viability-of-jobs-actcrowdfundingl.
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On October 23, 2013, the SEC released its proposed rules (SEC
Rules) covering the CROWDFUND Act for public comment. 13 This
release offers the first opportunity to examine the SEC's thoughts on
regulating disclosure under the exemption and any additional
requirements to be imposed.1 4 A thorough examination of the SEC
Rules relating to issuer disclosure under § 4A(b)(1),15 in relation to
empirical evidence on the types of infonnation most valued by
potential investors, suggests that the burden created by the required
disclosures is one for which small businesses and startups have little
choice but to undertake should they desire a successful offering under
the CROWDFUND Act exemption. 16
The rules proposed by the SEC limit the cost and burden to small
businesses and startups through the CROWDFUND Act exemption,
while preserving investor protection through specific required
disclosure and the additional structural limitation on investor
participation. 17 Part II of this Comment discusses what is meant by
"crowdfunding" securities and provides background on the need and
purpose behind the CROWDFUND Act, as well as some of the
benefits and potential disadvantages to the practice. 18 In Part III, key
requirements of the exemption for crowdfunding are presented along
with a discussion of empirical evidence highlighting types of
infonnation most valuable to investors when deciding whether or not
to purchase securities under crowdfunding. 19 Part IV examines the
rules proposed by the SEC governing the issuance of securities
utilizing the crowdfunding exemption within the context of required
disclosure by potential investors and issuing companies. 20 Part V
summarizes the likely impact of the SEC's proposed rules on the

13.

14.

IS.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Crowd funding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240); see also SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfimding,
U.S.
SECURITIES
AND
EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
(Oct.
23,
2013),
http://www. sec.govIN ewslPressReleaselDetaillPressRelease/ 13 705400 17677#. UtA4G
2R4aBU.
Until the release of the proposed rules by the SEC, commentary on the likely effects
of the CROWD FUND Act were based on speculation and came with the caveat that
until the SEC acted no one could be sure of how burdensome the disclosure
requirements might be on small businesses and startups. Rossenfeld, supra note 12.
Section 4A(b)(I) of JOBS Act, § 302,126 Stat. at 315-16 refers to the Securities Act
of 1933 (Securities Act) as amended by the CROWDFUND Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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viability of crowdfunding under the exemption to small businesses
and startup companies and examines the balance achieved between
the burden of disclosure on the issuer and investor protection. 21
II. CROWDFUNDING EQUITY SECURITIES
A. Background
The notion of crowdfunding security interests as a form of capital
financing for businesses arose out of the already ubiquitous practice
of crowdsourcing. 22 Crowdsourcing utilizes the power of the Internet
to reach out to the public at large and solicit small amounts of
funding from many investors in order to raise enough capital to
commence a project. 23 These projects have included activities such
as the creation of a t-shirt, a novel design for a smartphone case, or a
new musical album, mostly within the creative arts realm. 24 In
exchange for monetary donations to the requesting company, the
payer receives either one of the first offerings of the item, the item at
a lower than retail price, or some other incentive other than any type
of security interest in the company creating the project. 25 Websites
such as Kickstarter.com and Sellaband.com facilitate the setup of
these projects and provide a place for willing "investors" to search
out projects they wish to fund. 26 Currently, crowdsourcing can be
broken down into four main categories based on what the investor
receives in return for his contribution: donation-based, reward-based,
lending, and equity.27 At the time of this writing, the Securities Act
prohibits equity investment in such projects.28
21.
22.

23.

24.
25.
26.

27.

28.

See infra Part V.
Joan MacLeod Heminway & Sheldon Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfonding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REv. 879, 881 (2011)
(quoting Paul Belleflamme et aI., Crowdfonding: Tapping the Right Crowd 29 J. Bus.
VENTURING 585, 586 (Feb. 21, 2011)) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.comlabstract= 1578175); Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1457, 1459 (2013).
Ajay K. Agrawal et aI., Some Simple Economics of Crowdfonding, 14 INNOVATION
POL'y & ECON. 63, 65 (2014); see also Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of
Crowdfonding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. Bus. VENTURING 1, 1-3 (2013)
(discussing the "Pebble" smart watch project).
See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1458-59.
See id. at 1459.
See KrCKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2014);
SELLABAND, http://www.sellaband.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
Gerrit K.C. Ahlers et aI., Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding 6 (Oct. 14, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com!abstract=2161587.
See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1,6. The JOBS Act and subsequent passage of the SEC's rules
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Unlike crowdsourced projects where the public funder receives an
actual product in return for his investment, an investor in
crowdfunded equity securities will actually acquire a security interest
in the company.29 This ownership interest would potentially allow
the investor to receive dividends based on their security ownership
and to participate in a public offering of the company, should such an
event occur in the future.
The offering of a security interest, or anything that translated into a
share of profits, through one of these crowdsource web sites would
potentially require regulation under the Securities Act if the offering
met the definition of an "investment contract" under the Howey test. 30
Applying Howey using a five-prong analysis, commentators
Heminway and Hoffman concluded that it is likely a court would find
a crowdfunded security interest to be an "investment contract."3!
The existing regulatory framework under the Securities Act was
created with investor protection as a primary policy concern. 32 Under
a crowdfunding investment scheme, investor protection becomes an
even greater concern as the transaction involves both a high degree of
investment risk33 and a pool of unsophisticated investors. 34 The key
to creating a viable exemption for crowdfunded securities is to keep

29.

30.

31.

32.
33.

34.

related to the CROWD FUND Act exemption will end this prohibition on equity-based
crowdfunding; supra Part 1.
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1459-60. This acquired interest in the assets and profits
of the issuer brings these offerings under the regulatory umbrella of the Securities Act
ofl933. 15 U.S.c. § 77b(a)(l) (2012).
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 2(a)(1), 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(l) (2012»; see SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99
(1946) (setting out the test to determine when an investment scheme is considered an
"investment contract" under § 2(a)(l) of the Securities Act of 1933); Stuart R. Cohn,
The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 FLA.
L. REv. 1433, 1435 (2012).
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 904. The five prongs used in the analysis
are (1) contract, transaction, or scheme, (2) investment of money, (3) common
enterprise, (4) expectation of profits, and (5) solely from the efforts of others. Id.
892-904. After examining each prong in the context of a crowd funded security, the
authors conclude that each prong is likely to be satisfied by such an offering. Jd.
See id. at 927.
See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise
Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. LJ. 195, 196 (2012). "[I]nvesting in small business,
particularly at the startup stage, is inherently risky. The potential for fraud and selfdealing is high .... " Jd. There is an additional risk of a lack of liquidity as well. Id.
See id. The term "unsophisticated investor" applies to the general public, and
assumes a low level of financial sophistication as compared to sophisticated or
accredited investors. Id.
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disclosure costs low, while protecting the unsophisticated investorY
The informational asymmetry between the issuer and the
unsophisticated investor will be different, and likely greater, in the
context of equity crowdfunding than III other forms of
crowdfunding. 36
In order to best protect investors, meaningful disclosure on the part
of the issuing company is required. 37 This is no different for the
crowdfunded security than it is for other types of securities, and
meaningful disclosure was a primary focus of the existing securities
laws. 38 Because those investors choosing to invest via crowdfunding
are "subject to an unusually high degree of risk,"39 the need for
adequate disclosure of information about the company remains of
paramount importance. 4o
B. Benefits of Crowdfunding and the Exemption
Why, given the added risks surrounding crowd funded offerings,
was there such a push to create a mechanism by which companies
could sell equity securities to the public through crowdfunding? The
short answer is job creation and economic development. 41 For a
company looking to finance capital to start or grow their business,
crowdfunding offers several advantages over more traditional sources
of funding, primarily a lower cost of acquiring capital and access to
information. 42
The lower cost of acquiring capital through crowdfunded securities
may be due, in part, to a better match between the company and those

35.
36.

37.
38.

39.
40.
41.

42.

See id. at 196-98.
Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 6; see also Agrawal et aI., supra note 23, at 68 ("In
general, the most critical differences between equity and non equity crowdfunding will
arise due to the amplification of information asymmetries.").
Hazen, supra note 9, at 1737.
See id. at 1741-42. Rather than focusing on the merits of investments, securities laws
favor disclosure as a mechanism to ensure sufficiently informed investors. Id. at
1741.
Agrawal et aI., supra note 23, at 68.
See Hazen, supra note 9, at 1769.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012); see
also 157 CONGo REc. S188,8458 (daily ed. Dec. 8,2011) (statement of Sen. Jeff
Merkley) ("Low-dollar investments from ordinary Americans may help fill the void,
providing a new avenue of funding to the small businesses that are the engine of job
creation. The CROWDFUND Act would provide startup companies and other small
businesses with a new way to raise capital from ordinary investors in a more
transparent and regulated marketplace. ").
Agrawal et aI., supra note 23, at 71-72.
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investors willing to back their venture. 43 Geographic discrepancies
among small, young companies and investors become less of a
barrier when the potential group of investors is enlarged to include
anyone with Internet access. 44 Also potentially lowering the cost of
capital is the ability to "bundle" the sale of equity securities with
other types of rewards, should intermediaries support such an
option. 45
Finally, disclosure of more information under the
CROWDFUND Act could lead to a greater willingness to pay on the
part of investors, thus reducing the cost to issuers of acquiring
capital. 46
Another possible benefit to companies choosing crowdfunding may
be the ability to increase their access to information about their
product or business. 47
Similar to market-based research,
crowdfunding may provide relevant information about the product,
establish a pre-production market, and increase the likelihood of
success. 48
One of the main advantages of crowdfunding is that the costs of
crowdfunding will likely be lower versus traditional securities
offerings or initial public offerings (IPOS).49 Crowdfunding should
allow for the cost of raising capital from the public through the sale
of equity to become a viable method for startup companies and
smaller businesses. 50 Though the ability to raise funds through public
offerings has been available under SEC Regulation D,5l such
offerings, have only realistically been available to accredited
investors. 52

43.
44.

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

Id. at 71.
Id; see also Mollick, supra note 23, at 14 (noting that crowd funding helps to diminish
traditional geographic limitations by enabling online communities to participate in
investments).
Agrawal et ai., supra note 23, at 71. Other rewards which may be bundled with
securities include early product access, limited-edition products, and investor
recognition. Id.
Id. at 71; see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
Agrawal et ai., supra note 23, at 72.
ld.
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1467.
Id
Id at 1467-68. Regulation D sets forth the regulations issued by the SEC that
governs the securities that do not need to be registered under the Securities Act of
1933. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500-.508 (2013).
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1468. SEC Regulation D, in addition to state specific
Blue Sky Laws, has limited public offerings to accredited investors and allowed for
only private offerings with no advertising or "general solicitation." ld.
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The high cost of traditional offerings stems from compliance with
regulation and registration laws 53 and the cost of promotion. 54 These
costs can be especially burdensome for small-scale issuances of
securities, as the costs are not proportional to the size of the offering,
but are based instead only on regulatory requirements. 55 One of the
potential positive aspects of crowdfunded offerings under the
proposed exemption is a lower regulatory and registration burden
than the one under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 56 In
addition, promotion of the offering within the crowdfunding context
should be simpler through the use of the Internet and the availability
of intermediaries at all hours. 57 Despite this expectation of lower
cost, a significant burden remains 58 as disclosure of information to
potential investors is required in order to take advantage of the
exemption for crowdfunding. 59

C. Potential Negative Impacts of Crowdfunding on the Issuer
Although the benefits of raising capital through crowdfunding have
been lauded, there exist potential negative impacts beyond mere
disclosure requirements. 6o These negative impacts are more generally
applicable to the funding of capital through the issuance of equity.61
While a thorough discussion of these impacts is beyond the scope of
this Comment, they are briefly noted to present a more complete
picture of the advantages and disadvantages of acquiring capital
through the issuance of crowdfunded securities. In some instances,
the negative impact may be amplified by the use of crowdfunding
and the platform on which it is built. 62

53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1470.
Id. at 1468.
Id. at 1470. For example, preparation of a registration statement-required regardless
of the size of the issuance--can require as much as 1200 hours of work. Id. at 1469.

56.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.6a-l (2013). Whether or not these costs are in fact lower under
the exemption hinges on the proposed SEC rules. See infra Part IV.
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1471.
Id. at 1472.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(1) (2012); Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1472; see also infra
Part IV.
See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1477-80.
See id. at 1483-87 (explaining that the sale of equity creates fiduciary duties, exposes
directors and officers to the risk of personal liability, and empowers purchasers with
certain statutory rights).
See id. at 1478-79 (noting that Internet-facilitated communications increase the risk
and likelihood of proxy contests). Crowdfunding relies on the Internet and its ability
to connect those with a common interest yet separated by physical location. Id. at
1471. Regarding some negative impacts, as viewed by the issuer of the security,

57.
58.

59.
60.
61.

62.
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One disadvantage that may be heightened through crowdfunding is
the hostile takeover,63 as proxy fights will be cheaper and easier to
coordinate over the Intemet. 64 Another is the tender offer, where a
person, group, or competitor becomes the majority shareholder by
purchasing the shares of other shareholders. 65
In addition to increased potential for takeovers, several other
disadvantages exist from issuing equity through crowdfunding. 66
These potentially negative consequences include shareholder
derivative suits,67 demand by investors for company books and
records,68 disgruntled shareholders and lack of a secondary market,69
and voting rights for shareholders. 70
The disadvantages noted above involve complex considerations for
any company deciding whether to issue equity shares, through either
crowdfunding or any other registered or exempt offering. A more
thorough discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. Part III
discusses the exemption for crowd funding and examines the types of
information most valued by investors when making an investment
decision.

63.

64.

65.

66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

associated with funding capital through sale of equity, the ability for equity holders to
communicate and coalesce via the Internet increases the risk to the issuer. Id. at
1486-87.
A takeover is "[t]he acquisition of ownership or control of a corporation ... typically
accomplished by a purchase of shares or assets, a tender offer, or a merger." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1591 (9th ed. 2009). A taker over is considered hostile when it is
"resisted by the target corporation." Id.
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1477-78. These proxy battles are not governed by federal
laws, as those laws cover only registered securities. Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1479. Though coercive takeovers have since been regulated, and two-tier tender
offers effectively banned, those prohibitions apply only to registered securities. Id. at
1480.
Id. 1483-84.
Id. 1483. The potential for derivative suits may necessitate the added cost of
directors' and officers' insurance to cover liability. Id. at 1483-84.
Id. at 1486-87. Shareholder demands for access to company books and records have
the possibility ofleaking confidential corporate information. Id. at 1485-86.
Id. at 1486-87. "[D]isgruntled shareholders are more likely to petition management
for change in the context of crowd funded securities than has traditionally been the
case for public companies." Id. at 1487. Furthermore, shareholders are restricted
from selling their shares on any secondary market for a period of one year after
purchase unless the transfer of securities satisfies one of the four exceptions under this
provision. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-I(e) (2012).
Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1487.
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III. EXEMPTING CROWD FUNDED EQUITY SECURITIES
One of the intended benefits resulting from crowdfunding is a
decreased cost to issuing equity.71 Without the exemption for
crowdfunded securities, offering anything that translated into a share
of profits would potentially require regulation under the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act) if the offering met the definition of a
security under the Howey test. 72 Traditional securities, under which
crowdfunded securities would fall if not exempted, face a system of
heavy and burdensome regulation. 73 In addition, companies selling
securities under the Securities Act are required to register and comply
with the regulatory process, or face liability for fraud or false and
misleading information. 74 The expenses associated with such a
registration-which include accounting, legal, and other fees-make
this prohibitively expensive for small businesses. 75 The typical filing
of a registration with the SEC, even for a small offering, can be as
much as $100,000. 76
Small businesses, however, existed prior to the Internet and the
arrival of crowdfunding. 77 While Regulation D of the SEC contains
exemptions for small businesses from the prohibitive registration
costs of the current system,78 an exemption under Regulation D
would not be feasible within the crowdfunding context. 79 Exempted
offerings under Rules 504, 505, and 506 of Regulation D contain
several provisions restricting their applicability to crowdfunded
securities. 80 The provisions include a ban on general solicitation, a

71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.

See supra Part II.B.
See Cohn, supra note 30, at 1435; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 908.
Id. See § 77k of the Securities Act, which provides a purchaser with a cause of action
against the seller in the case of misleading or omitted statements of material fact in
any part of the registration. 15 U.S.c. § 77k(a) (2012).
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 909-10.
Id. at 909. The initial registration with the SEC includes underwriting, fees to the
SEC, legal and accounting fees, cost of printing, and various other fees. Id. at 908.
See id. at 880-81.
Hazen, supra note 9, at 1744-46.
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 913.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.506 (2013). Regulation D refers to § 77a et seq. of the
Securities Act of 1933, which exempts certain transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012);
17 C.F.R. § 230.500(a) (2013). Rule 504 prohibits exemptions where transactions are
based on solicitation. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(4); 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. Rule 505 exempts
transactions with only accredited investors, and only if there is no advertising or
public solicitation. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(5); 17 C.F.R. § 230.505. Under Rule 506, all
transactions would be subject to the full disclosure requirements under § 77d-lb. 15
U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
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maximum of thirty-five purchasers, and a requirement that disclosure
of specific financial and non-financial information be made to nonaccredited investors. 81 Certainly the unsophisticated investor whom
the small business wishes to target its crowdfunding efforts is not an
accredited investor,82 and thus the exemption from the burdensome
registration and disclosure process is unattainable.
A. Key Requirements of the Exemption

A primary purpose behind creating the exemption for
crowdfunding was to allow for small, otherwise insignificant
investment in small companies. 83 Notwithstanding, meaningful
disclosure must be a part of the exemption-this includes risks,
obligations, benefits, financial history, and information about the
business that are necessary for investors to evaluate the merits of
investment. 84 As Hazen stated, "the impersonal nature of the Internet
would seem to call for more, rather than less, investor protection."85
These investors are likely unsophisticated and are strangers to the
business with no additional information to that which is available
over the Internet. 86 In this regard, "social media technologies
increase rather than decrease the potential for fraud" and further
highlights the need for adequate disclosure. 87
The question moving forward is, to what extent does the exemption
for crowdfunding increase the viability of small businesses raising
capital through the sale of security interests? Do the disclosure
requirements differ substantially from those under the traditional
offerings?

81.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 918; see also Hazen supra note 9, at 174849; supra note 80.
An "accredited investor" is one who meets the definition under Rule 501(a) of
Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. 230.501(a) (2013). For natural persons, Rule 501(a)
specifies an accredited investor as a person: (1) "whose individual net worth, or joint
net worth with that person's spouse, exceeds $1,000,000," excluding the value of the
person's primary residence; or (2) "who had an individual income in excess of
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person's
spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable expectation
of reaching the same income level in the current year." 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(6).
Cohn, supra note 30, at 1434.
Hazen, supra note 9, at 1753.
Id. at 1766.
Id.
Id. at 1769.
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The proposed requirements under the CROWDFUND Act and
comments regarding those proposals highlight the existing tension
between investor protection and the cost of raising capital through
crowdfunding. 88 Efforts to protect the investor may leave the small
business facing costs for registration and meeting ongoing regulatory
requirements that effectively erase any benefit from being able to
issue the securities. 89 The recently released regulations proposed by
the SEC covering the crowdfunding exemption offer one indication
of just how costly compliance with the exemption may ultimately
be. 90
Prior to the release of the SEC's proposed rules, some authors
expressed a desire for the SEC to keep the exemption for
crowdfunding simple and streamlined to allow it to achieve the goal
of providing a low cost alternative for raising small capital. 91 With
the release of the proposed rules, it appears the SEC was listening.

B. Disclosure Information Relevant to Investors - Empirical
Evidence
Given the desire to create a workable exemption for crowdfunding
that both protects the investor from unscrupulous and fraudulent
issuers and imposes a reasonable burden of disclosure on the issuer,92
it becomes important to investigate which pieces of information are
most relevant to the investment decision. 93 Are the disclosure
requirements under the CROWDFUND Act exemption in accord
with what the unsophisticated investor would or should want to know
in order to make an informed investment decision? If so, are the
proposed regulations issued by the SEC likely to increase or decrease
the burden of disclosure on small business wishing to utilize the
exemption? Two recent empirical studies have examined the factors
influencing investment decisions within the crowdfunding context.
In Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding, Ahlers and authors
investigate which signals by small start-up companies lead investors
to purchase equity securities through crowdfunding. 94 The authors
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Jd. at 1767.
See id. at 1738.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428,66,509 (proposed Oct. 23, 2013) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,227,232,239,240) ("[T]he average cost of achieving initial
regulatory compliance for an initial public offering is $2.5 million, followed by an
ongoing compliance cost, once public, of $1.5 million per year. ").
Roundtable, supra note 12, at 52.
See supra Parts ILA, lILA.
See Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 1-2.
Jd. at 3.
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acknowledge that both "the mechanisms and dynamics of
crowdfunding
are not yet well understood. "95 However, by
looking at data based on existing investment decisions within a
crowdfunded context, the authors are able to make some conclusions
regarding the influence of several types of disclosed information. 96
Outside of the United States, equity crowdfunding has become
increasingly important as an alternative means for raising capital for
small businesses or start-ups.97 The volume of equity crowdfunding
has doubled every year since 2009, and in 2011, start-ups around the
world raised an estimated $88 million in funding. 98 This funding
came from small investors who typically do not have the ability to
thoroughly research potential investment decisions. 99 In order to
successfully raise capital, small businesses and start-ups must
"signal," or disclose, to investors that they have a value worthy of
investment. 100 The signaling by these companies is equivalent to the
disclosure required under the CROWDFUND Act exemption. 101
Disclosure has, at its core, the goal of ensuring that investors are well
informed about the company in which they may choose to purchase
securities and, as such, presents a signal of their value. 102
ld. at 1.
ld. at 3.
Jd. at 1. As crowdfunding within the United States has only recently become feasible
through the JOBS Act, markets outside the United States are used to examine equity
funding through crowdfunded means. See id. at 1-3.
98.
Jd.
99. ld. This reference to small investors equates to the unsophisticated investor
referenced elsewhere in this Comment and the literature.
100. ld.
101. Compare Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 1-3 (finding start-ups that signal, or disclose,
the following information attract higher numbers of investors: financial forecasts and
disclaimers, a long history of being in business prior to seeking equity crowdfunding,
a high number of board members, a high number of board members that hold an MBA
degree, better networks, and an intention to seek an exit by either an IPO or trade sale
rather than by other modes of exit), with infra Part IV (noting that the CROWDFUND
Act exemption requires disclosure of the following information: a list of executive
officers, a description of the business in the form ofa business plan, information about
the company's use of proceeds and existing capital, and a financial statement
including a narrative discussion of the company's financial situation).
102. See Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 1 (explaining that in order for start-ups to
successfully raise funds through crowdfunding, they must clearly disclose their value
to small investors, who often comprise the main source of support for many start-ups);
Ross S. Weinstein, Note, Crowdfunding in the u.s. & Abroad: What to Expect When
You're Expecting, 46 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 427, 434-35 (2013) (disclosing information
provides investors with a straightforward way to assess the value of their potential
investment, determine the risks involved, and avoid fraud).

95.
96.
97.
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Additionally, the type of signaling most effective for the small
investor is likely different than that for angel investors or venture
capitalists. 103
An analysis of which signals are important to small investors was
performed using data on offerings from the Australian Small Scale
Offerings Boards (ASSOB).I04 From these offerings, six types of
data were collected: basic information, financial statements, external
certifications, board experience, history of investment, and the speed
of investment. 105 Using this data, the authors estimated several
models for predicting whether an investor would invest in the
security being offered. 106 The estimation of the model produced
coefficients indicating the relative effect of each type of data on the
decision to invest. 107
Based upon the ASSOB data, start-ups with a larger number of
board members, higher levels of education,108 and better networks
were more likely to have successful offerings. 109 In addition,
companies signaling their intention to offer an IPO in the future or
seek acquisition by another company, as opposed to other exit
strategies, had an increased likelihood of attracting investors. llo
Companies who did not provide financial forecasts were less likely to
attract investment and tended to raise less overall capital over an
extended period of time. III Finally, companies that had been in
business for some time prior to entering the equity crowdfunding
market were more likely to reach their capital goals. ll2 This suggests
that new small businesses and recent start-ups could, regardless of
disclosure, face a difficult time generating capital through equity
crowdfunding.
Overall, the study based on the ASSOB data indicates that
"financial roadmaps (such as preplanned IPO or acquisition exit
103. See Ahlers et aI., supra note 27, at 2. Angel investors and venture capitalists are
experienced, seasoned investors who are deemed sophisticated and therefore less
likely to fall prey to offerings based on fraud or misrepresentation. See id.
104. Id. at 3. The authors looked at data from 104 offerings from the Australian Small
Scale Offerings Board ("AS SOB") between October 2006 and October 2011. Id.
105. Id. at 13.
106. Id. at 39.
107. Id. at 39-40.
108. Education levels were "measured by the percentage of board members holding an
MBA degree." Id. at 3.
109. Id.
110. Id. Other exit strategies included leveraged buyouts and reverse takeovers, or no
indicated exit strategy. Id. at 43.
111. Id.at3.
112. Id.
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strategies) and risk factors (such as amount of equity offered and
whether financial forecasts are provided)," and board experience are
important pieces of information to potential investors. 113 Disclosure
of these items by the issuer would seem to be necessary regardless of
any burden imposed by their requirement under the exemption.
In The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, Ethan
Mollick predicts the effects of various types of information on
investment decisions for crowdfunded equity securities. 114
Acknowledging the importance of crowdfunding and its emergence
as a growing area for entrepreneurs, Mollick sought to explore the
potential for this newly viable method for capital funding. 115 He
suggests that crowdfunded projects "mostly succeed by narrow
margins, or else fail by large amounts.""6 Success for the issuer of
crowdfunded equity seems to be connected to project quality, because
these higher quality projects are more likely to result in greater
funding. 117 Additionally, and in conjunction with the Internet-based
form of crowdfunding, companies with a larger number of friends
and social network presence are more likely to have successful
offerings. 118
Mollick defines crowdfunding as "an open call, essentially through
the Internet, for the provision of financial resources either in form of
donation or in exchange for some form of reward and/or voting rights
in order to support initiatives for specific purposes.""9 Whether
crowdfunding becomes an alternative for more traditional methods of
financing remains to be seen; however, it may in the very least
provide a vehicle by which to follow the more established funding
routes. 120
As crowdfunding within the United States was not permitted, and
remains so until the SEC regulations are finalized, Mollick used

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

ld. at 30.
See Mollick, supra note 23, at 1-2.
Jd.atl.
Jd. at 2.
ld.
ld.
ld. (quoting Armin Schwienbacher & Benjamin Larralde, Crowdfunding of Small
Entrepreneurial Ventures, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE
369,371 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012)).
120. See id. at 3. Mollick gives, as an example, the recent successful Kickstarter campaign
by the makers of the "Pebble" smart watch that led to the receipt of venture capital
after being initially rejected. ld.
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crowdsourcing data extracted from the Kickstarter website. 121
Though not able to offer equity securities through crowdfunding,
Kickstarter uses a patronage and reward model to allow companies to
generate capital to fund their projects. 122 In addition, Kickstarter
provided the inspiration for the recent JOBS Act legislation and the
creation of the CROWDFUND Act exemption. 123 In this regard,
Kickstarter provides a useful model for demonstrating what
information is most relevant in the crowdfunding context. 124
As noted in the previous article, signaling within the crowdfunding
context represents a critical exchange of information between the
issuer and investor. 125 "Since investments are uncertain, investors
often need to act on partial information about particular ventures."126
Thus, potential signals of quality may be especially important for
start-up ventures and small businesses, where information about the
company may be obscure or unreliable. 127 Quality, as signaled to
investors, was measured by the preparedness of the Kickstarter
project pitches. 128 Project pitches included videos relating to the
projects and project updates with textual descriptions. 129
In
measuring preparedness based on the project pitches, Mollick also
considered spelling errors within the text. 130 A quality project pitch,
both in terms of professional looking videos with relevant updates
and grammatical correctness, provides a signal to the potential
investor that the issuer is concerned with quality and likely represents
a better investment than one who does not. 131
Along with quality, in an era of Internet based funding, the size of
the social network associated with the company seeking funds also

121. Id. at 4. Kickstarter was the largest, and most dominant, crowdfunding site at the time
the paper was written. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
126. Mollick, supra note 23, at 7.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 8. Preparedness equates to the degree to which the project founders adhered to
the standards for successful pitches. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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influences success. 132 Network size was measured based on the
number of Facebook friends of the project founders. 133
Estimating the relevance of signals of quality and their effect on
successful funding, Mollick concludes that investors do assess the
potential of the founders seeking crowdfunding of their projects. 134
In addition, the importance of geography as it relates to the location
of the company and the investor (funder) is reduced.135 Despite being
only a small business or start-up, the fact that the company is not
located near the investor does not reduce the likelihood of
investment, as it might under a more traditional funding
methodology. 136
Mollick uncovers several clear lessons for companies considering
crowdfunding their projects. Quality is key, and ways in which to
signal high quality to the potential funder should be considered. 137
The company should also set appropriate goals that allow for
delivering the product on time and careful planning both in setting
these goals and in executing them. 138 Though these results are
directly applicable within the Kickstarter project context of a
company raising funds to make a product, they are also relevant in
examining disclosure within the equity crowdfunding context.
Signaling within the Kickstarter framework is analogous to
disclosure under an equity crowdfunding scenario, as it provides
relevant investment information to the potential investor. The results
of Mollick's study may be applied to what is disclosed by issuers of
crowdfunded equity securities. Disclosure of goal setting and plans
for product creation within the more traditional crowdfunding model
are no different than a sound business model and path for growth
which would be outlined in disclosure documents by a company
offering the sale of securities.

132. ld.; see also Alhers et aI., supra note 27, at 3 (noting that companies in business for
some time prior to seeking crowd funding were more likely to be successful at raising
funds, and success may have been due, in part, to having an existing social network).
133. Mollick, supra note 23, at 8. Within the estimation of the econometric model,
network size was calculated as the log of the number of Facebook friends. ld.
134. Id. at 14.
135. ld.
136. See id.
137. ld.
138. ld.
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C. Capping Investor Exposure Under the CROWDFUND Act
In addition to the required issuer disclosure under the
CROWDFUND Act, "the Act [also] includes a structural protection
for investors that limits their potential losses."J39 This protection
takes the form of limiting the total aggregate amount of securities an
issuer can sell to a given investor in a twelve-month period. 140 The
aggregate amount allowed for investment is based on a tiered system
taking into account the annual income and net worth of the individual
investor. 141 This tiered system effectively sets the upper limit that
any individual may invest in crowd funded securities during any
twelve-month period at $5,000. 142 Thus, the very structure of the
CROWDFUND Act exemption attempts to limit the potential losses
to an investor by capping the aggregate amount invested. 143
One issue raised by this structural protection has been how to
monitor the aggregate amount invested. 144 While the CROWDFUND
Act does not specify any method for ensuring compliance with this
provision, it is likely that the private sector will create a solution. 145
However, until such a system has been adopted, it will fall upon the
issuer to make certain that the individual investors to whom they
issue securities have not exceeded their aggregate amount. 146

139. Roundtable, supra note 12, at 50; see 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012).
140. § 77d(a)(6)(B).
14l. The relevant aggregate amount allowed is determined as
(B) the aggregate amount sold to any investor by an issuer,
including any amount sold in reliance on the exemption provided
under this paragraph during the 12-month period preceding the
date of such transaction, does not exceed(i) the greater of $2,000 or 5 percent of the annual income
or net worth of such investor, as applicable, if either the
annual income or the net worth of the investor is less than
$100,000; and
(ii) 10 percent of the annual income or net worth of such
investor, as applicable, not to exceed a maximum
aggregate amount sold of $100,000, if either the annual
income or net worth of the investor is equal to or more
than $100,000[.]
Jd.
142. Roundtable, supra note 12, at 50-5l.
143. Id.
144. Hazen, supra note 9, at 175l.
145. Thaya Brook Knight et aI., Comment, A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer on
Securities Crowdfunding and Title III of the JOBS Act, 2 MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY &
VENTURE CAP. L. 135, 143 (2012).
146. Jd.
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Perhaps more importantly, concern for whether or not this
structural requirement will in fact protect the unsophisticated investor
from fr~lUdulent offerings has been raised. 147 The assumption that, by
merely limiting investors to small amounts, fraud will be deterred is
misplaced. 148 "Even limiting the exemption to relatively small
amounts such as $250 or $500 does not mean that there is an
insufficient investor-protection stake such that scrutiny is not
warranted."149
However, others have acknowledged the need for balance between
the burden of disclosure on issuers and the protection of investors. 150
"To minimize investor losses without unduly increasing the cost to
issuers, investors should be protected not through complicated,
expensive mandatory disclosure requirements, but through less costly
structural requirements."151 The cost, however, of implementing and
monitoring this tiered system may be large. 152 Despite this potential
cost, it is also important to consider the benefits stemming from this
approach in the context of the entire exemption. 153
Thus, the capping of aggregate investment by any individual
investor provides a structural balance to the disclosure required by
the issuer. This provision, as with the exemption itself, is subject to
regulatory guidance by the SEC. 154 Whether or not the necessary
balance exists is dependent on how the SEC handles compliance.
IV. THE SEC PROPOSED REGULATIONS
On October 23, 2013, the SEC released for public comment the
proposed regulations for exempting crowdfunded securities offerings
under the JOBS Act revision to the Securities Act of 1933. 155 In
releasing the proposed regulations, the potential impact of the
disclosure requirements on small businesses may be evaluated. 156

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

156.

Hazen, supra note 9, at 1765-66.
Id.
Id. at 1765.
Bradford, supra note 33, at 198; see also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at
953.
Bradford, supra note 33, at 198.
Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 953.
Id.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Oct. 23, 20l3) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, & 249).
See John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act's Strange Bedfellows: Democracy and
Start-Up Company Investing, 62 U. KAN. L. REv. 357, 372 (20l3) ("The Crowdfund
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The proposed regulations cover the entirety of the new exemption, 157
which includes the creation of and regulations for intermediaries to
act as brokers or exchanges between the issuing companies and the
investors.
However, the following discussion focuses on the
disclosure requirements for the issuing company and the costs of
compliance as a potential deterrent from utilizing the exemption.
Disclosure requirements for businesses wishing to issue securities
under the exemption for crowdfunding amends the Securities Act of
1933 by adding § 4A, which corresponds to § 302 of the JOBS Act. 15S
Specifications for issuer disclosure are contained in § 4A(b)(1).'5 9
Some of the items required for disclosure are the name, address, and
website of the issuer; a descriptioI\ of the business; the financial
condition of the business; the purpose or intended use of the
requested funds; and a description of the ownership and capital
structure of the business. 160 Additionally, under § 4A(b) (1 )(1), the

157.
158.

159.
160.

Act's ongoing disclosure requirement breaks new ground in regulating the
relationship between investors and managers of small companies.").
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428,66,431-37.
See id. at 66,428. The SEC is "proposing new rules and forms to implement
Securities Act Sections 4(a)(6) and 4A and Exchange Act Sections 3(h) and 12(g)(6)."
Id. at 66,430.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I) (2012); Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,437-38.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,437-38. The full list of disclosed items as
presented includes:
•
The name, legal status, physical address and Web
site address of the issuer;
•
The names of the directors and officers (and any
persons occupying a similar status or performing a
similar function), and each person holding more than
20 percent of the shares of the issuer;
•
a description of the business of the issuer and the
anticipated business plan of the issuer;
•
a description of the financial condition of the issuer;
•
a description of the stated purpose and intended use
of the proceeds of the offering sought by the issuer
with respect to the target offering amount;
•
the target offering amount, the deadline to reach the
target offering amount and regular updates regarding
the progress of the issuer in meeting the target
offering amount;
•
the price to the public of the securities or the method
for determining the price; and
•
a description of the ownership and capital structure
of the issuer.
Id. at 66,438 (footnotes omitted).
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SEC may require additional disclosures in order to protect investors
and the public interest. 161
The SEC acknowledged community concern with respect to the
disclosure and its burden, stating that "[ c]ommenters expressed
concerns about the extent of the disclosure requirements and stated
that overly burdensome rules would make offers and sales in reliance
on Section 4(a)(6) prohibitively expensive. We recognize these
concerns and have considered them in determining the disclosure
requirements that we should propose in this release."162 Public
concern over the potential burden resulted in the SEC declining to
recommend a specific format for the disclosure materials, opting
instead to let each company determine the appropriate format. 163 In
addition, there is no requirement for duplicative disclosures where
information overlaps. 164
The information required to be disclosed by companies wishing to
utilize the CROWDFUND Act exemption fall into three broad
categories: business and ownership information; company finances
and the offering itself; and updates and ongoing reporting. 165 Within
each of these groupings, the SEC has specifically addressed aspects
of disclosure with the intent of easing the burden of meeting the
requirements for small businesses. 166 Though the burden remains
sizable for any small operation wishing to request capital via
crowdfunding, especially with regard to company finances and the
offering itself, it does not approach the cost associated with a
traditional registered offering. 167

161. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(I)(2012).
162. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,438 (footnote omitted).
163. ld.
We expect, however, that an issuer, along with the intermediary,
would determine the format that best conveys the required
disclosures and any other information the issuer determines is
material to investors. We recognize that there are numerous ways
to achieve that goal and, as such, we are not proposing to mandate
a specific disclosure format.
Id. (footnote omitted).
164. Id.
165. ld.
166. See id.
167. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the costs related to a
traditional, non-exempt offering.
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A. Business and Ownership Information
Business and· ownership interest information consider three aspects
of disclosure relating to the issuing company: officers, beneficial
owners, and the company.168
1. Officers
One important piece of information for disclosure concerns the
officers of the business issuing the securities. The SEC has proposed
to define officers as they are defined under the Securities Act Rule
405 and Exchange Act Rule 3b-2.169 Under these definitions, an
issuer would be required to disclose information regarding its
president, vice president, secretary, treasurer or principal financial
officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer and any person
routinely performing corresponding functions with respect to any
organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to the extent it
has individuals serving in these capacities. 170
Disclosure of information relating to officers of the company
would be for the previous three years, not the five years required
under other types of offerings. 171 The SEC contends that this
requirement of three years will be less burdensome and believes the
firms undertaking crowdfunding will be smaller startups. 172
However, the question remains whether a two-year difference in the
outlying years provides much relief to small companies trying to raise
capital in their first few years of operation. In practice, the difference
between three years and five years would likely have only a minimal
impact on the reporting burden. 173
2. Beneficial Owners in Excess of 20 percent of Shares of Issuer
Another important piece of information to be disclosed to
prospective investors is that of beneficial owners. 174 Beneficial
168. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,438-39.
169. Id. at 66,438. An officer is defined as "a president, vice president, secretary, treasurer
or principal financial officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer, and any
person routinely performing corresponding functions with respect to any organization
whether incorporated or unincorporated." 17 C.F .R. § 230.405 (2013). The Exchange
Act Rule 3b-2 defines officers equivalently. ld. § 240.3b-2 (2013).
170. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,438-39.
171. Jd. at 66,439. Other offerings specifically referred to are registered offerings and
offerings that are exempt under Regulation A. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 22, at 940~ I (discussing inevitable costs
associated with the proposed rules arising from legal transition costs).
174. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,439.

2014

The CROWDFUND Act

149

owners are those who own existing shares in the company prior to the
current offering. 175 Under § 4A(b)(1 )(B), the issuer must disclose
"the names of each person holding more than 20 percent of the shares
of the issuer."176 Determination of these individuals is proposed as
"the names of persons, as of the most recent practicable date, who are
the beneficial owners of 20 percent or more of the issuer's
outstanding voting equity securities, calculated on the basis of voting
power. We refer to this group of persons as '20 Percent Beneficial
Owners."'177
According to the SEC, fixing the date as the most recent practicable
date l78 would ensure that companies issuing shares under the
exemption would not encounter a greater burden than companies
issuing standard registered offerings. 179 Utilization of the most recent
practicable date does ensure some uniformity with the existing
standard for registered offerings. 180 However, the shift from
reporting beneficial owners at the five-percent level to the twentypercent level appears to offer the most relief to the small business. It
is more likely that there are fewer beneficial owners at the higher
percentage associated with the crowdfunding exemption.
3. Description of the Business
The final disclosure relating to the overall business, located in §
4A(b)(1)(C), is a description of the business itself in the form of a
"business plan."181 This information is of great value to potential
investors, whose interest in what the company plans to do and how it
operates aids in the investment decision.
Empirical evidence
discussed in Part III.B established that one of the essential factors to a
successful offering relates to information about the issuer.182
However, small companies, and especially startups, would be wary of
sharing too much information for fear they might lose their

175. ld.
176. ld.
177. ld.
178. The use of the term "practicable date" mirrors similar usage under item 403 of
Regulation S-K, which applies to registered offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 229.403 (2013).
179. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,439. Standard registered offerings regulated under
Regulation S-K require the furnishing of information as of the most recent practicable
date of ownership interests of more than five percent of any class of voting securities.
§ 229.403.
180. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,439.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(C)(2012); Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,440.
182. See supra Part III.B.
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proprietary property. 183 In response to these concerns, the SEC
proposed that the required "business plan" need not include internal
management documents or marketing documents used for
solicitation. 184
B. Company Finances and the Offering
While information relating to the offering itself is an important
disclosure to investors, information about the company's finances
and capital structure is equally important in ensuring that the investor
has all of the relevant information to make an informed investment
decision. 185
1. Use of Proceeds
One important piece of information relevant to the investor
regarding the offering is the intended use of the proceeds raised
through the offering. 186 Whether the funds are needed in order to pay
off existing debt or other obligations versus investment in research
and development can influence a potential investor's decision. 18 ?
Capital funds raised through the offering may be used to acquire
assets or other businesses, compensate intermediaries or employees,
or repurchase some of the issuer's outstanding securities. 188
How much information, and how detailed, relating to the use of the
funds raised through the offering is left to the discretion of the
issuer. 189 Rather than mandate a set form or minimal amount of
required disclosure, the SEC requires only that some disclosure of the
intended use of the proceeds be made. 190 While this does not free the
issuer from the burden of making such disclosure, it does offer some
flexibility in how much needs to be released and thus also in the size
of the burden. 191 In many cases, a simple statement that the funds
raised are for product development or talent acquisition may

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1485-86.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,440.
See id. at 66,437-38,66,440.
15 V.S.c. § 77d-l(b)(l)(E) (2012).
See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,440.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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suffice. l92 However, this lack of a formal requirement may leave the
issuer vulnerable to an action by investors should problems arise. 193
2. Target Offering Amount
In addition to disclosing the intended use of the funds raised
through the securities offering, the issuer must also disclose
information relating to the target amount of funds desired. 194 The
target amount is important both for investor's desire to know how
much the company is trying to raise and to the likelihood of the
offering being finalized; since the entire offering through the
crowdfunding mechanism will only occur if the target amount is
realized. 195 Should the company fail to raise the targeted amount, the
entire transaction is canceled and all investor purchases for that
offering are returned. 196
In order to ensure that investors are fully informed, the SEC
proposes that both the target amount of the offering as well as the
maximum offering amount that the issuer will be accept be
disclosed. 197 Thus, if the issuer has set their target amount at
$150,000, but is willing to sell securities up to $500,000, the issuer
must disclose both amounts. This is important, as an investor who
believes he will have a certain percentage of shares based on the
target amount may find his percentage reduced, possibly
significantly, if enough investors are interested and the company is
willing to sell more shares than targeted. 198 To this point, the SEC is
also requiring the issuer to disclose their process for allocating shares
in the event of an oversubscribed offering. 199
Since there exists a possibility that the entire transaction may be
canceled should the target amount not be met, the SEC proposes that
a clear disclosure of the investors' right to cancel must be made. 20o
As well, disclosure of the investors' need to reconfirm their

192. See id.
193. Under § 77d-l(c)(2), an issuer is liable for material misstatements and omissions. 15
U.S.c. § 77d-l(c)(2) (2012).
194. ld. § 77d-l(b)(l)(F).
195. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,440-4l.
196. ld. at 66,441.
197. ld. at 66,440-4l.
198. John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin,
and Venture Capitalists' Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583, 616
(2013).
199. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,44l.
200. ld.
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commitment in certain situations is required. 201 Finally, the issuer
must also disclose that, should the target amount not be reached, no
securities will be sold and all commitments are canceled. 202 While at
first glance it may appear to require much from the issuer, the reality
may be that once a standard is developed, the majority of issuing
companies can simply use a generic set of statements. The burden of
these disclosures is alleviated through the use of boilerplate
descriptions of the processes, tailored to each specific offering. In its
discussion of the proposed regulations, the SEC included a brief
outline suggesting some items for inclusion in these disclosures. 203
3. Offering Price
As the offering is for a security interest in the issuing company, the
price of the security must be disclosed to the investor. 204 However,
the price of the security may be based upon the number of shares sold
or some other method. 205 Therefore, the SEC has proposed that the
issuer must disclose either the offering price or the method for

201. Jd.

202. ld.
203. ld.
As such, we propose to require issuers to describe the process to
cancel an investment commitment or to complete the transaction
once the target amount is met, including a statement that:
•
Investors may cancel an investment commitment
until 48 hours prior to the deadline identified in the
issuer's offering materials;
•
the intermediary will notify investors when the target
offering amount has been met;
•
if an issuer reaches the target offering amount prior
to the deadline identified in its offering materials, it
may close the offering early if it provides notice
about the new offering deadline at least five business
days prior to that new deadline (absent another
material change that would require an extension of
the offering and reconfirmation of the investment
commitment); and
•
if an investor does not cancel an investment
commitment before the 48-hour period prior to the
offering deadline, the funds will be released to the
issuer upon closing of the offering and the investor
will receive securities in exchange for his or her
investment.
ld. (footnotes omitted).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(1)(G) (2012).
205. See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,457.
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determining the price. 206 Should the issuer disclose the method to be
used in determining the offering price, rather than the price itself, the
investor must then receive the final offering price in writing and all
required disclosures prior to the sale. 207
4. Ownership and Capital Structure
As discussed previously, the current ownership structure within the
issuing company and the capital structure of the company are
important considerations for the investor. 208 Section 4A(b)(1 )(H)
specifies disclosures by the issuer relating to the terms of the
securities issued; the effects of rights of existing shareholders on the
securities offered; information about existing shareholders owning
twenty percent or more of any class of the issuer's securities; how the
offered securities are valued; and the risks associated with the
securities offered. 209 In addition to what is already required under the

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 66,441.
Id.
See supra Part III.B.
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,44l. Section 77d-l(b)(I)(H) of the JOBS Act
specifically states:
[A] description of the ownership and capital structure of the
issuer, including(i) tenns of the securities of the issuer being offered and
each other class of security of the issuer, including how
such tenns may be modified, and a summary of the
differences between such securities, including how the
rights of the securities being offered may be materially
limited, diluted, or qualified by the rights of any other
class of security of the issuer;
(ii) a description of how the exercise of the rights held by
the principal shareholders of the issuer could negatively
impact the purchasers of the securities being offered;
(iii) the name and ownership level of each existing
shareholder who owns more than 20 percent of any class
ofthe securities of the issuer;
(iv) how the securities being offered are being valued, and
examples of methods for how such securities may be
valued by the issuer in the future, including during
subsequent corporate actions; and
(v) the risks to purchasers of the securities relating to
minority ownership in the issuer, the risks associated with
corporate actions, including additional issuances of
shares, a sale of the issuer or of as- sets of the issuer, or
transactions with related parties[.]
15 U.S.C. § 77d-I(b)(I)(H) (2012).
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regulation, the SEC proposes requiring additional disclosures
including the number of securities being offered or those outstanding;
whether or not the offered or existing securities have voting rights;
any limitations on voting rights; and a discussion of any restrictions
on transferring the securities.2lO The SEC notes that "[a]lthough
Section 4A(b)(1)(H) does not specifically call for this disclosure, we
believe that such disclosure would be necessary to provide investors
with a more complete picture of the issuer's capital structure than
would be obtained solely pursuant to the statutory requirements."211
By adding these additional requirements, the SEC is "not proposing
to prescribe content or format for this information, but rather to set
forth principles of disclosure."212
In an effort to ensure that investors are provided a "complete
picture" of the issuer's existing capital, the SEC is also proposing
additional requirements beyond those statutorily proscribed.213
According to the SEC, disclosure of the name, Commission file
number and Central Registration Depository number (CRD number)
(where applicable) of the intermediary through whom the offering is
being conducted should be required. 214 The SEC believes disclosure
of these identifiers will aid investors in gathering information about
the offering as well as background information on the intermediary.215
The amount of compensation paid to the intermediary for
conducting the offering should be disclosed including any referral or
other expenses connected with the offering. 216 This would inform the
investor as to what portion of the proceeds from the offering will go
to covering the cost of the offering, as well as provide a mechanism
for monitoring these costs.217
Finally, to aid the investor generally, the SEC also proposes:
•
•

210.
21l.
212.
213.
214.
215.

disclosure of certain legends to be included in the
offering statement;218
disclosure of the current number of employees of the
Issuer;

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,441-42.
ld. at 66,442.
ld. at 66,444.
ld. at 66,442.
Jd.
ld. Issuance of the CRD number comes from the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, Inc. (FINRA) and not the SEC. ld. at 66,442 n.133.
216. ld. at 66,442.
217. ld.
218. These legends will aid the investor in better understanding "the general risks of
investing in a crowdfunding transaction." ld.
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a discussion of the material factors that make an
investment in the issuer speculative or risky;
a description of the material terms of any
indebtedness of the issuer, including the amount,
interest rate, maturity date and any other material
terms;
disclosure of exempt offerings conducted within the
past three years; and
disclosure of certain related-party transactions. 219

All of these additional proposed required disclosures fall under the
SEC's authority provided by § 4A(b)(1)(I).220
5. Financial Statements
Under the crowdfunding exemption, issuers would be required to
disclose company finances for the previous twelve-month period. 221
The amount of disclosure necessary follows a tiered approach based
on the aggregate target offering amounts of the present offering and
all other offerings in the prior twelve months. 222 In clarifying how to
219. Id. (footnotes omitted).
220. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b)(I)(I), 126 Stat.
306,318 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(l)(I) (2012)). "Section 4A(b)(l)(I)
provides us with discretion to require crowdfunding issuers to provide additional
information for the protection of investors and in the public interest." 78 Fed. Reg. at
66,442 n.132.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(D) (2012).
222. The tiered approach is specified as
(D) [A] description of the fmancial condition of the issuer,
including, for offerings that, together with all other offerings of
the issuer under section 77d(6) of this title within the preceding
12-month period, have, in the aggregate, target offering amounts
of(i) $100,000 or less(I) the income tax returns filed by the issuer for
the most recently completed year (if any); and
(II) financial statements of the issuer, which
shall be certified by the principal executive
officer of the issuer to be true and complete in all
material respects;
(ii) more than $100,000, but not more than $500,000,
financial statements reviewed by a public accountant who
is independent of the issuer, using professional standards
and procedures for such review or standards and procedures
established by the Commission, by rule, for such purpose;
and
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calculate cumulative current and prior offering amounts, the SEC
suggests the aggregate offering amount would only include those
securities offered and sold.223 This attempts to keep down the cost to
issuers whose prior crowdfunded offerings were unsuccessful, but
prevents potential abuse in the form of structuring large offerings as a
series of smaller offerings.224
Specifically regarding the issuer's financial statements as required
under § 4A(b)(I)(D), the SEC proposes
a complete set of their financial statements (a balance sheet,
income statement, statement of cash flows and statement of
changes in owners' equity), prepared in accordance with
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles ("U.S.
GAAP") , covering the shorter of the two most recently
completed fiscal years or the period since inception of the
business.225
The SEC views the two-year requirement as a compromise, citing
one year as insufficient and three years as too burdensome on small
issuers.226
Tax returns remain required under the proposed
regulations, with privacy concerns addressed through redaction of
personally identifiable information (e.g., social security numbers) by
the issuer. 227
For those issuers requiring review by a public accountant,228 the
qualification of the independent public accountant should comply
with Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X.229 This requirement will provide
investors with confidence as to the reliability of the statements. 230
The SEC refuses to increase the threshold for requiring audited
financial statements to offerings greater than $500,000, as Congress
specifically chose the existing $100,000 to $500,000 range. 231 "If we

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

(iii) more than $500,000 (or such other amount as the
Commission may establish, by rule), audited financial
statements [.]
Id. (footnote omitted).
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,445.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66,446.
Review by a public accountant would be applicable to offerings of greater than
$100,000 but less than $500,000. 15 U.S.C. § 77d-l(b)(I)(D)(ii) (2012).
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,446. See Regulation S-X for specific requirements
for qualification of accountants. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2013).
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,446.
Id.at66,446-47.
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were to raise the threshold to $1 million, as suggested by some
commenters, it would eliminate the requirement for issuers ever to
provide audited financial statements because the maximum offering
amount under. Section 4(a)( 6) is $1 million. "232
In addition to the numerical and accounting financial requirements,
the SEC also proposes requiring the inclusion of a narrative
discussion of the company's financial situation. 233 The purpose of
this narrative is to reveal any prior operating history of the company
not included in the other financial statements. 234 If no prior history
exists, then the issuer should describe financial milestones as well as
operational, liquidity, or other challenges. 235
C. Updates and Ongoing Reporting

Disclosure by the issuer is not confined to static information
provided at the outset of the offering but also includes periodic
These
updates and possible amendments to the offering. 236
requirements produce an additional burden on the issuer wishing to
utilize the exemption for crowdfunding. 237 Under § 4A(b)(1)(F), the
issuer must file updates as to their progress in meeting the targeted
offering amount. 238 The SEC has proposed that the filing of the
update occur no later than five (5) days after particular intervals have
been met (e.g. 50 percent and 100 percent of target).239 And, if the
issuer is accepting a sale of securities in excess of their target
amount, the issuer must file an update no later than five (5) days after
the offering deadline that discloses the total amount of securities
sold. 240 One result of these update filings is to create a central
repository for this information within the SEC. 241 While the burden
associated with these updates depends on the issuer and the specifics
of each offering, the knowledge that such requirements exists may
well affect a small business's decision to engage in crowdfunding as
a means for raising capital.

232. Id. at 66,447 (footnote omitted).
233. Id. at 66,444.
234. See id.
235. Id.
236. 15 U.S.c. § 77d-l(b)(I)(F) (2012).
237. Other burdens include disclosure of business and ownership information, company
finances, and information relating to the offering. See discussion supra Part IY.A-B.
238. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,449; see also 15 U.S.c. § 77d-l(b)(1)(F) (2012).
239. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,449.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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1. Amended Offering Statement
The SEC proposes to require that an issuer must file an amended
offering statement whenever there is "any material change in the
offer terms or disclosure previously provided to investors."242 This
conforms to the desire to protect investors and make certain that they
have all of the relevant information needed to properly evaluate the
investment opportunity. A material change is one where "there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it
important in deciding whether or not to purchase the securities."243
Changes considered material include the issuer's financial condition,
the intended use of the proceeds from the offering, and how the final
price is determined in cases where only the method was initially
disclosed. 244
2. Ongoing Reports
Section 4A(b)(4) requires that the issuer file annual reports on
operations and financial statements with the SEC and provide them to
investors. 245 Under the proposed rules, the issuer relying on the
crowdfunding exemption would be required to file within "120 days
after the end of the most recent fiscal year covered by the report. "246
As for providing operations and financial reports to investors, the
SEC proposes that the publication of an annual report on the
company website would be sufficient, as it "believe[ s] that investors
in this type of Internet-based offering would be familiar with
obtaining information on the Internet and that providing the
information in this manner would be cost-effective for issuers. "247
The requirement for filing the annual report, which does create a
burden particularly for a small company that previously had no public
shareholders, would continue until one of three conditions is met. 248
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 66,450.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(4) (2012).
Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,451.
Id.
Id. The three conditions are that
(1) [t]he issuer becomes a reporting company required to file
reports under Exchange Act Sections 13(a) or 15(d); (2) the issuer
or another party purchases or repurchases all of the securities
issued pursuant to Securities Act Section 4(a)(6), including any
payment in full of debt securities or any complete redemption of
redeemable securities; or (3) the issuer liquidates or dissolves its
business in accordance with state law.
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Annual report filing would cease when the issuer becomes a reporting
company,249 the issuer or another buys all of the securities sold under
the exemption, or the issuer dissolves or liquidates. 25o

D. Individual Investor Investment Cap
In addressing the investment cap provided under § 4(a)(6)(B), the
SEC acknowledged two practical aspects of the limitation. 251 The
first involves the calculation of the investment limit and concerns that
under some scenarios an investor may be subject to two limits.252
Because paragraph (i) and paragraph (ii) apply to "either" income or
net worth, there is potential for an investor to be subject to both
paragraphs.253 "[I]n [a] situation in which annual income is less than
$100,000 and net worth is equal to or more than $100,000 (or vice
versa), the language of the statute may be read to cause both
paragraphs to apply."254
In order to clarify the calculation of the investment limit, and avoid
the scenario above, the SEC proposes to utilize the "greater of' the
investor's annual income and net worth.255 "[I]f both annual income
and net worth are less than $100,000," then the investor's limit would
be $2,000 or five percent of annual income or net worth, whichever is
greater. 256 Where both annual income and net worth exceed
$100,000, the limit would be the greater often percent of the annual
income or net worth, not to exceed a limit of $100,000.257 Here, the
SEC is enabling the appropriate application of the structural
protection of investors. 258
The second practical aspect of the investment limitation addressed
by the SEC in their proposal was that of monitoring investor

ld.
249. A reporting company is one which is required to file reports under the Exchange Act
§§ 13(a) or 15(d). Id. Section 13(a) covers issuers of securities registered on a
national exchange under 15 U.S.c. § 781. ld. at 66,554; 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012).
Section 15(d) covers registered brokers and dealers of securities. Crowdfunding, 78
Fed. Reg. at 66,554; § 780.
250. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,451.
251. /d. at 66,433.

252. Id.
253. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B) (2012).
254.

Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,433.

255. Id.
256. Id. (emphasis in original).
257. Id.
258. See supra Part III.C.
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conformance with the limitation. 259 Echoing the concerns raised by
commenters regarding enforcement of the investment limitation,260
the SEC proposes to place the burden of monitoring on the
intermediaries. 261 The SEC would "allow an issuer to rely on efforts
that an intermediary takes in order to determine that the aggregate
amount of securities purchased by an investor will not cause the
investor to exceed the investor limits .... "262 This reliance, however,
is subject to the issuer not having knowledge that the investor has
already exceeded their limit or would do so under the transaction
with the issuer.263 Having made this proposal, the SEC has asked
specifically for comments on whether or not allowing reliance on the
intermediary is appropriate. 264
Given the high number of transactions that intermediaries will
handle in their role, it makes sense that they would ensure investor
compliance with the limitation. If the intermediaries hold investor
financial information, it would be appropriate for these intermediaries
to develop a system by which investor compliance can be
ascertained. Burdening the individual issuers with the task of making
sure that each investor has not exceeded their investment limitation,
and will not with the current transaction, will likely raise costs to the
issuer. These increased costs from monitoring could outweigh the
benefit of raising capital through crowdfunding. As such, the balance
between investor protection and reasonable burdens on the issuer
would be upset.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the purposes behind the JOBS Act, and the creation of an
exemption for crowdfunding, was to institute a less costly means by
which small businesses and startup companies could raise capital
through issuing equity securities to the public. 265 Decreased costs are
associated with being exempt from the registration requirements that
accompany traditional offerings of equity to the public, which entail
substantial disclosure of information to investors. 266 However,
concern for investor protection and the potential for increased risk
associated with the Internet require that disclosure of information to
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,434.
See supra text accompanying notes 144-146.
Crowd funding, 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,434.
Id.
Id.
Jd. at 66,434-35.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part II.B.
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investors remains meaningful. 267 In addition, investors are protected
by a limitation on the aggregate amount they may invest in
crowdfunded securities. 268
The rules proposed by the SEC regarding disclosure by issuers
under the CROWDFUND Act attempt to strike a balance between the
burdensome disclosures for registered securities and a desire to
protect the public investor. 269 Examining the information desired by
investors, and relevant to their investment decision, reveals that the
disclosures required under the CROWDFUND Act and those added
by the SEC pertain to the very information investors seek. 270 As
such, despite the burdens associated with disclosing information
about the company-its officers, shareholders, financial information,
and periodic updates-a company wishing to raise capital through the
selling of equity securities will certainly find a lower cost in utilizing
the exemption for crowdfunding than in pursuing a more traditional
public offering.271 Disclosure requirements, as determined under the
SEC proposed rules, pose a lesser burden on the issuer, in part, due to
the structural component of the limitation on aggregate investor
purchases. 272 As such, the cap on investors offsets the reduction in
required disclosure. 273
There will always be costs for a company when trying to raise
capital, and disclosure of information is essential to securing investor
commitments.274 Through the CROWDFUND Act, and the rules
proposed by the SEC, small businesses and startup companies will
have a viable mechanism for raising capital from public offerings of
equity via crowdfunding. 275

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

275.

See supra Part lILA.
See supra Part lILC.
See supra Part lILC.
Compare supra Part m.B (discussing the infonnation sought by investors), with Part
IV.A-C (explaining the disclosures required under the SEC's proposed rules).
This sterns from an exemption from additional requirements associated with a
registered offering under the Securities Act. See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part IILC.
See supra Part III.C.
Any attempt to raise capital requires some fees and charges simply to handle basic
accounting and legal necessities. Some infonnation, however minimal, must be
disclosed to investors in order to lead to a successful attempt at raising capital. See
supra Part III.B.
See supra Parts II.B., IV.
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